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Abstract: The “policy science” of civil wars, which emerged in the early 1990s, included deeply embed-
ded assumptions about the nature of the international political system. It was taken for granted that the 
United States would remain the strongest power by a wide margin, and that it would lead a liberal coa-
lition that included virtually all the other strong states in the world. Some students of international pol-
itics believe that the nature of the system is changing. Though the United States is likely to remain much 
more powerful than its global competitors, several consequential powers have emerged to challenge U.S. 
leadership and produce a multipolar system. As power begins to even out at the top of the internation-
al system, the influence of middle powers may also grow. This new constellation of power seems likely to 
magnify disagreements about how states suffering civil wars should be stabilized, limit preventive diplo-
macy, produce external intervention that will make for longer and more destructive wars, and render set-
tlements more difficult to police. 
Over the last seven decades, civil war has become 
much more prevalent than interstate war as a form of 
organized military conflict. On the average, 2.2 new 
civil wars break out every year, with nearly fifty such 
conflicts ongoing today.1 Since the end of the Cold 
War, scholars, diplomats, and soldiers have poured 
enormous energy into understanding the causes, 
courses, and consequences of civil wars, even as co-
alitions of outside powers have intervened in civil 
wars to terminate them altogether, or at least to ame-
liorate the collateral damage. Much of this thinking 
and practice emerged during what international re-
lations scholars dubbed “the unipolar moment,” the 
unusual concentration of all forms of power in the 
hands of the United States in the 1990s. This concen-
tration of power enabled, though did not demand, 
U.S. efforts to manage civil wars. It also created a 
kind of gravitational force that subtly affected the-
ories of conflict management. The possibility that 
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another great power would be a player in 
these civil wars, an opponent of negotiated 
settlements, or a spoiler in the aftermath of 
such settlements was seldom considered. 
Because some knowledgeable observers 
believe that the unipolar moment is wan-
ing, this essay first discusses uni-, bi-, and 
multipolarity, and how international pol-
itics may vary as a consequence of differ-
ent structures of power. It then deduces the 
plausible effects of these different struc-
tures on the three phases of potential ex-
ternal intervention in civil wars: preven-
tion, termination, and peace enforcement. 
It draws exemplary material from the Bal-
kan Wars of the 1990s and the ongoing Syr-
ian Civil War. In general, if multipolarity is 
in our future, then I believe external inter-
vention to manage civil war is going to be-
come much more difficult.
Scholars, policy analysts, and policy-mak-
ers have used “polarity” as an organizing 
concept since at least the beginning of the 
Cold War. It captures the intuition that the 
distribution of power in the internation-
al political system affects the behavior of 
the states that compose it, and that though 
there may be many nation-states in the 
world, power tends to cluster at the top. The 
distribution of power is taken to be some-
what measureable and, for meaningful pe-
riods, to be fixed in character. In modern 
times, the size and dynamism of an econ-
omy of one state relative to that of another 
is often taken as a good, though imperfect, 
proxy for relative power, since it is from the 
economy that hard power–military power 
 –is ultimately distilled. Territorial extent, 
geography, population, and the level of de-
velopment also matter, as does a state’s will-
ingness on a regular basis to convert these 
assets into military power. 
Scholars often mark the birth of the mod-
ern international system with the Treaty of 
Westphalia in 1648, which ended the hor-
rendous bloodletting of the Thirty Years’ 
War and established the principle of state 
sovereignty.2 From then until the end of 
World War II, states operated in a multi-
polar world, in which three or more states 
typically jockeyed for position on approxi-
mately equal terms. Occasionally, one state 
became much stronger than the rest, bid for 
hegemony, and was thwarted at great cost. 
The Cold War is usually described as a bi-
polar world: the power of the United States 
and the Soviet Union dwarfed that of the re-
maining states, and each was obsessed with 
the threat posed by the other. The emer-
gence of the bipolar distribution of pow-
er was seen as so unusual that it prompted 
scholars to begin thinking about how sys-
tems of different polarity might behave dif-
ferently.3 In the immediate aftermath of the 
Soviet collapse, scholars and pundits quick-
ly began to describe the world as unipolar. 
The U.S. government’s National Intelli-
gence Council has forecast that unipolar-
ity is on the wane, to be replaced by a new 
multipolar world.4
Polarity matters particularly to those in-
ternational relations theorists who style 
themselves as “realists.” Realists argue 
that all states must deal with one overar-
ching problem: anarchy. They live in a po-
litical system without an overarching au-
thority. States must look to their own secu-
rity because there is no agreed-upon global 
police force to call if they find themselves 
the victims of a crime. States thus live in 
a “self-help” system, and power, especial-
ly military power, is a key means of self-
help. It is also the key means for despoiling 
one’s neighbors. Power is both problem 
and solution. States eye one another wari-
ly, and when they can improve their own 
insurance–by expanding their national 
power or reducing the power of another 
 –they will often do so, subject to calcula-
tions of benefit and cost. They compete 
particularly in the realm of national ar-
maments, and depending on structure, in 
the realm of building and/or eroding alli-
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ances. Not all states will play the game. But 
states that fail to play the game often suf-
fer for their abstention. As the game is con-
stant, there are plenty of learning oppor-
tunities. The anarchical condition makes 
polarity a particularly important variable. 
In a world in which there is no overarching 
authority to prevent or punish the use of 
force, the distribution of power–the abil-
ity to use force–casts a long shadow. Real-
ists like to say that the distribution of pow-
er, the structure of the system, “shapes and 
shoves.” It presents constraints and cre-
ates incentives, even for the most powerful 
states in the system. Structure influences 
state behavior, but it does not determine it.
Unipolarity is a world in which the pow-
er of one state dwarfs that of the rest. Most 
scholars seem to agree that the U.S. position 
in the 1990s is the only example we have of a 
unipolar system. Unlike bipolar and multi-
polar systems, the “unipole” faces few con-
straints; rather, it lives in a world of temp-
tation. Facing little meaningful opposition, 
the United States was tempted to organize 
the world according to its own, mainly lib-
eral theories. The order of the day was the 
spread of democracy and market econo-
mies, and preservation of the unusually 
happy power position enjoyed by the Unit-
ed States. Though the tremendous differ-
ence in power between the United States 
and others constituted a temptation, it at 
the same time made the United States quite 
secure. This introduced an element of ca-
price into U.S. behavior. The United States 
took up some causes and not others; it did 
not intervene in every civil war to protect 
liberal principles or remake governments. 
During the unipolar moment, the United 
States intervened most often in civil wars 
that occurred close to other existing U.S. in-
terests. The Balkans exerted a magnetic at-
traction because of its proximity to nato, 
and Haiti became a priority because thou-
sands of its unhappy citizens could attempt 
a boat trip to the United States. And the ex-
pansion of the borders of the nato alliance 
in Europe, while impressive, nevertheless 
slowed as it approached the borders of the 
much weakened, but still nuclear capa-
ble, Russian remnant of the Soviet Union. 
Though other states occasionally tried to 
“balance” U.S. power, or throw wrenches 
in U.S. projects, these states did not have 
many cards to play, and they knew it. They 
might oppose the United States in the un 
Security Council, or simply not show up to 
assist with some U.S. projects, but in gen-
eral, the principal costs the United States 
encountered were exacted by the designat-
ed “villains” in those military interventions 
the United States chose to undertake, and 
these costs were low until the 2003 inva-
sion of Iraq.
Unipolarity was noteworthy for the way 
it affected thinking about intervention. To 
begin, the United States or the coalitions 
that it led could intervene in a civil war 
without having to think about threats else-
where. No one could argue that one could 
not afford to have troops tied down in 
the Balkans because those military forces 
might be needed elsewhere. Indeed, then–
un Ambassador Madeleine Albright fa-
mously asked: what were the troops for if 
not intervention? Second, no one could 
argue that the designated villains in these 
civil wars were protected by other great 
powers, for there was no other great pow-
er to protect them. Third, the decision 
to intervene, and the appropriate strate-
gy of intervention, was mainly a negotia-
tion among like-minded middle powers: 
long-standing members of the U.S. Cold 
War camp who were themselves too weak 
to either oppose the United States or to 
force its hand. Fourth, given the tremen-
dous U.S. superiority in military power, 
the United States and its coalition partners 
typically expected that the wars would be 
cheap, and that the United States would 
pay most of the costs anyway. 
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The unipolar moment also affected inter-
national norms. Norm entrepreneurs, most 
of them dedicated to the spread of liberal 
norms, seem to have presumed that power 
would continue to be concentrated in the 
hands of a liberal state. For example, those 
who advanced the notion of the “responsi-
bility to protect” (r2p)–which asserts that 
outsiders have a perfect right to intervene in 
the internal affairs of other countries whose 
governments, in the eyes of outsiders, abuse 
their people–were unconcerned about the 
concomitant erosion of the traditional sov-
ereignty norm. The notion that the older 
sovereignty norm may have helped damp-
en international conflict among great pow-
ers was not much discussed. 
A bipolar structure of power is equally 
rare, and the Cold War is our only example. 
When two states overshadow the rest, they 
eye one another warily because each is the 
greatest threat to the other. The competi-
tion tends to become all-encompassing. As 
each power tries to preserve or improve its 
position, the other scrutinizes these moves 
for how they might become a threat, and 
how they might be exploited. Countermea-
sures are taken rather quickly when the oth-
er superpower seems to be up to something. 
In the Cold War, the competition includ-
ed military means, science and technolo-
gy, the accumulation of allies (despite their 
modest utility), and competitive interven-
tions in civil wars. Of course, structure can-
not explain everything about the intensity 
of the Cold War competition; the parties 
had vastly different ideologies and visions 
about how the world should work, adding 
energy to an already fraught situation. And 
the two sides confronted one another with 
unfamiliar but extremely frightening nu-
clear weapons. Fear of nuclear escalation 
seems to have put downward pressure on 
the competition: the two sides struggled 
for advantage but seemed mindful of the 
possibility of disaster. It is noteworthy that 
despite direct involvement in many wars, 
and indirect support of the opposing sides 
in many others, there was no direct violent 
clash of U.S. and Soviet forces. Finally, the 
bipolar nature of the competition seems 
to have had a strange liberating effect on 
each side’s willingness to get involved in 
local conflicts. Instead of fearing that in-
volvement in a civil war would reduce ca-
pabilities that might be needed elsewhere 
to oppose the other great power, these con-
flicts were perceived as part of the central 
competition. One posited reason for this is 
that, due to the nuclear competition, each 
side had a very strong interest in credibil-
ity. Thus, a fight for credibility anywhere 
could be viewed as contributing positively 
to the credibility of one’s commitments to 
risk nuclear war worldwide.
Competitive Cold War interventions 
produced particularly tragic outcomes. 
The parties to these civil wars were ren-
dered artificially strong by outside assis-
tance, so the wars were more intense and 
longer-lasting than they might have oth-
erwise been.5 Once they had chosen sides, 
the superpowers might find themselves in 
one of several kinds of traps. If one’s pre-
ferred side fared poorly, there was a strong 
temptation, as happened in Vietnam and 
Afghanistan, to intervene directly to save 
one’s proxy. This presented a tempting op-
portunity to the other superpower to add 
resources to its client in order to bleed its 
principal opponent. This was an inexpen-
sive way to improve one’s own power po-
sition. At the same time, when the two su-
perpowers were involved directly or indi-
rectly in a civil war, they feared escalation 
to direct engagements between their own 
forces. As both parties were major nuclear 
weapons states, a direct clash would pro-
duce risks and costs far in excess of any-
thing to be gained from the civil war. Thus, 
the two sides tended to focus more on “not 
losing” than on winning, further prolong-
ing the suffering of the civilians living in 
the war zone. 
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Multipolar systems have three or more 
great powers. But measuring relative power 
in the twenty-first century is a tricky prop-
osition. By many measures, the United 
States is still comfortably ahead of its clos-
est competitor–China–though the gap is 
narrowing quickly. My criteria for a great 
power are a large and diverse economy, ca-
pable nonnuclear forces, some ability to 
project power beyond borders, and nucle-
ar deterrent forces with the ability to retal-
iate against a state’s most plausible adver-
saries and maintain that ability in the face 
of a determined arms race. (Possession of 
an assured retaliatory capability is essential 
for a state to pursue an independent securi-
ty policy in the nuclear age.) By these crite-
ria, the key powers are currently the United 
States, China, and Russia. France, Britain, 
and India constitute a second tier of impor- 
tant powers. By mid-century, Russia and In-
dia will likely reverse positions. Strict pari-
ty among great powers is not a requirement 
for viewing a system as multipolar; histor-
ically, there has often been a very large gap 
between the most and the least capable 
“great powers.” This analysis assumes that 
the world is trending toward multipolarity 
and asks what difference it makes.
States compete for power and security in 
multipolar systems, but the sheer number 
of players changes the game. First, in mul-
tipolar systems, allies matter more than 
they do in other systems. With a handful 
of powers at the top of the global order, coa-
litions can often significantly outweigh the 
capability of any single state. Thus, though 
states in a multipolar world must look to 
their own armaments in order to be alli-
ance-worthy, they must also look to the di-
plomacy of coalitions. A second property 
of multipolar worlds is divided attention. 
With many possible allies or adversaries, 
states will tend to see the possibility for 
incremental gain; for example, if State A 
concludes that State B is otherwise occu-
pied with State C, that presents opportu-
nity. Third, the fear of countervailing co-
alitions imposes caution. In our time, the 
presence of nuclear weapons imposes still 
further caution. Fourth, it is plausible that 
multipolarity mutes ideological competi-
tion. The need to make one’s own alliances 
and undermine those of an adversary may 
cause states to submerge their ideological 
differences.
If the world is trending toward multipo-
larity, this should affect external interven-
tion in civil wars. The great powers will be 
more concerned about other great powers, 
which should make civil wars generally 
less important to them and thus make ear-
ly preventive intervention less likely. The 
exception to this generalization may arise 
when civil wars occur in regions of partic-
ular political importance for geographical, 
economic, or ideological reasons, such as 
the greater Middle East. But in these cas-
es, great-power competition will be in-
tense from the outset, exactly when co-
operation would be most useful for pre-
vention. When multilateral intervention 
is proposed in the collective interest of 
the international community, the princi-
pal powers will still be concerned with rel-
ative gains. This will further complicate 
the prospects for collaborative efforts to 
settle the civil war. States may still wish 
to involve themselves in particular civ-
il wars, for their own selfish reasons; be-
cause the problems posed by civil wars are 
often local, the most proximate great pow-
ers will be the most tempted to intervene. 
Finally, once one great power does inter-
vene, and if its effort goes awry, it will be 
tempting for others to exploit the situation 
to improve their own position. Other great 
powers may aid the opposing side simply 
because the opportunity to enfeeble their 
competition is too tempting. Alternative-
ly, they may offer assistance to continue 
the intervention or offer to create a diplo-
matic fig leaf to cover a disengagement, at 
a high cost to the intervener. 
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A final property of the emerging multi-
polar world that will affect intervention lies 
just outside the realm of the great powers. 
The National Intelligence Council ground-
ed its forecast of a multipolar world in a 
larger discussion of a diffusion of power: 
the post–Cold War spread of economic, 
technological, and military capabilities to 
states and to nonstate actors.6 Middle and 
small powers themselves often intervene in 
civil wars, especially in their own neighbor-
hoods, and their capabilities will also grow. 
Their interventions can produce some of 
the same negative consequences as great- 
power interventions.
The unipolar moment plausibly affected 
the theory and practice of preventive di-
plomacy, direct intervention, and postwar 
settlements. First, decisions to intervene 
could then be made in a kind of geopolit-
ical vacuum. The argument for noninter-
vention based on scarcity of resources and 
a concomitant fear that being tied down 
in a small war might make one vulnerable 
elsewhere to a large challenge was irrele-
vant. At the same time, given the great se-
curity enjoyed by the victorious Cold War 
liberal coalition, the security case for in-
tervention was usually weak. The situation 
caused analytic attention to be focused else-
where. The main problems became how to 
get great powers to pay attention to emerg-
ing civil wars and engage in preventive ac-
tion of some kind. The responsibility to 
protect is the expression of this problem. 
Advocates of r2p seem to have hoped that 
an agreed-upon international norm would 
create a predisposition to act, if it seemed 
that a government had lost its willingness 
or ability to look after all of its citizens. The 
existence of this normative predisposition 
would also motivate great powers to devel-
op early-warning indicators so they could 
substitute early preventive diplomacy for 
the use of military power later. These two 
strands have in some sense come to frui-
tion. Though arguments continue on what 
r2p means practically, and how strong the 
norm is, the notion that outside military 
intervention is warranted in cases of ex-
treme violence is a part of the foreign pol-
icy debate. Western intelligence agencies 
have tried to develop better an ability to 
warn of impending civil wars and of mass 
atrocities. Given the low interests that great 
powers have in most civil wars, these tools 
were never destined to be particularly ef-
fective.7 But a multipolar world will likely 
make them even less effective.
Preventive diplomacy often either does 
not occur, or is ineffective. Attention then 
turns to how outside powers can help bring 
a civil war to an end. Once a civil war be-
gins, the combatants hope to decisively de-
feat one another and do so quickly. Such 
splendid victories are rare, and it is more 
often the case that the wars settle into at-
trition battles.8 In such battles, the com-
batants must “measure” relative power 
and relative will. This helps them assess 
the future costs of fighting relative to their 
perceived benefits and the odds of achiev-
ing them. Analysts suggest that “hurting 
stalemates” can develop: a combination of 
high costs and perceived futility that will 
make the warring parties more prone to 
negotiate, if given a nudge by outside pow-
ers, and assurances that outsiders will po-
lice any agreement to prevent defection. 
The values that underlie the r2p norm 
suggest that it can be difficult for outside 
observers to wait for a hurting stalemate. 
This has led some analysts to suggest that 
outsiders should intervene militarily to 
terminate the conflict and midwife a set-
tlement. Intervention could involve aid-
ing one side to defeat another, or simply 
intervening militarily to choose the win-
ner and the loser. Outsiders are often moti-
vated to intervene because one side is seen 
to be committing more human rights vi-
olations than another, and that side be-
comes the chosen target. The important 
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thing to note about this kind of thinking is 
that it assumes that outsiders could agree 
on a strategy, and could bring to bear over-
whelming power if they chose to do so. It 
also assumes that once outside powers tar-
geted their villains, they could simply iso-
late them from significant outside support. 
The military involvement of the powerful 
United States would ensure that the costs 
of the intervention would remain low, and 
thus induce other states to join a coalition.
After prevention and termination, the 
search for a stable settlement is the third 
phase of outside intervention in civil wars. 
Civil wars have a tendency to recur, and 
there is a risk that an ostensible settlement 
is really only a kind of break for rest and 
recuperation. The combatants retreat to 
their corners, and perhaps each hopes for 
the best; but insofar as they have been liv-
ing in a Hobbesian state of nature for the 
duration of the fighting, each assumes the 
worst of the other. They arm against the 
possibility of the others’ defection, they 
view any evidence of preparation for de-
fection in the worst possible light, and they 
are tempted to engage in a preemptive or 
preventive return to war. Practitioners and 
scholars alike have concluded that outside 
interveners might be able to sustain peace 
agreements by acting as an enforcer of the 
peace agreement and the protector of any 
party victimized by another’s cheating. The 
term “peace enforcement” was added to the 
term “peacekeeping” to capture this more 
muscular form of external assistance. The 
peace enforcers would need to be more ca-
pable and more willing to fight than tradi-
tional un peacekeepers. It helps if they are 
also significantly more capable militari-
ly than any of the combatants in the war. 
There are only a few militaries in the world 
large enough, competent enough, and with 
the strategic reach to do this kind of work, 
especially following wars in which the com-
batants themselves have developed some 
real capability.9 
The experience of the Balkan Wars in 
the 1990s provided both the object lesson 
of failure to engage in preventive diploma-
cy, and the template for intervention and 
peace enforcement. Outsiders did little to 
forestall the dissolution of Yugoslavia, and 
let the Slovenian and Croatian armed re-
bellions and secessions proceed without 
much diplomacy to prevent them. Secre-
tary of State James Baker famously averred 
that the United States did not have a “dog in 
this fight.” Bosnia similarly disintegrated, 
and after years of bloody warfare, the Unit-
ed States and several allies helped to build 
up the Bosnian and Croatian forces against 
the Serbs, and then contributed nato air-
power as these revived forces went on the 
offensive. Though Russia supported Serbia 
diplomatically, it had few cards to play at 
the time, and thus the central obstacle to 
Western direct intervention was the inabil-
ity of Western countries to decide on an ap-
propriate objective. The Europeans would 
have been content to partition Bosnia; the 
Clinton administration was not. It took ad-
ditional years of bloody warfare, covert U.S. 
assistance to the Bosniaks and Croats, and 
the emerging possibility of a large prestige 
loss to nato to produce agreement among 
outsiders about a political objective. At the 
same time, the Bosniaks and Croats were 
subjected to some outside discipline during 
the final battles of the war, and were told 
by the United States that the complete de-
feat of the Serbs would also not be tolerated. 
As part of the Dayton Accords, nearly six-
ty thousand Western peacekeeping forces 
and political administrators were commit-
ted to Bosnia, with another twenty thou-
sand nearby in support, to police a settle-
ment that gave each of the three sides some 
of what it had fought for, but left all some-
what unsatisfied. Though admirers of the 
peace settlement observe correctly that the 
killing stopped and has not resumed, the 
Bosnia-Herzegovina thus created is politi-
cally unstable. De facto partition, proxim-
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ity to Europe and its power, the eu’s con-
stant supervision, and Bosnian dependence 
on Europe for a livelihood keep the country 
together, but only in name.10 
Kosovo did see an effort at preventive 
diplomacy, but the political solution rec-
ommended in the Rambouillet Accord 
amounted to the Serbian surrender of 
Kosovo to nato. Though a bit of a surprise 
to nato, the Serbs tested nato’s serious-
ness in battle, and by all accounts the war 
was a surprisingly close thing. A un reso-
lution provided a face-saving exit for Serbi-
an troops from Kosovo, after which nato 
installed the peace-enforcement operation 
kfor (Kosovo Force) to assure that Serbi-
an forces would not return, a mission that 
continues with some 4,500 troops today. 
Kosovo has since formally seceded from 
Serbia, though many countries do not rec-
ognize its independence. Responding to 
the arrival of nato’s troops in Kosovo, 
a small unit of Russian troops in Bosnia 
raced for the Pristina airport to protect 
what the Russians perceived as their eq-
uities in the conflict. This could have pre-
cipitated a major crisis, but the kfor com-
mander on the ground, British Army Lieu-
tenant General Michael Jackson, chose to 
avoid a confrontation. The episode was a 
harbinger of how the intervention prob-
lem is likely to change as more great pow-
ers emerge and begin to see the course, 
management, and outcome of civil wars 
as matters of national interest. 
For several reasons, early intervention to 
forestall outright civil war is less likely to 
occur in a world with more than one conse-
quential power. First, simply because more 
traditional security challenges exist, even 
those liberal powers most prone to inter-
vene have more to worry about from a se-
curity standpoint than they did in the “uni- 
polar moment.” Potential civil wars will 
receive even less attention. Second, when 
a state becomes politically unstable, other 
consequential powers are likely to look at 
that instability through their own power 
and security interests. If one of them wish-
es to organize preventive diplomacy, others 
may ask how the outcome might affect their 
power and security. Third, because of these 
concerns, it will likely be more difficult to 
get the issue in front of the un Security 
Council and produce a resolution authoriz-
ing legitimate preventive diplomacy. Final-
ly, as we have seen, new consequential pow-
ers do not wish to legitimate certain kinds 
of intervention. As Chuck Call and Susan-
na Campbell observe in the forthcoming 
companion to this volume: “Many states 
are therefore extremely focused on avoid-
ing any transgression against the principle 
of state sovereignty that might set a prec-
edent for intervention (including against 
their own government).”11 If an interven-
tion is couched in terms of the responsibil-
ity to protect, these states are likely to mo-
bilize the traditional sovereignty norm as a 
counterargument. 
The coexistence of several consequential 
powers should also influence the course 
of civil wars. If the notion of a “hurting 
stalemate” has any traction as a poten-
tial source of settlements, then competi-
tive outside interventions may make this 
less likely. Not all political instability that 
erupts into actual warfare will attract the 
interest of major powers, but some will. 
Though hardly dispositive, the number 
of civil wars that feature direct outside in-
tervention has grown noticeably over the 
last decade.12 Outside powers could have 
a range of motivations attracting them 
to support one side or the other in a civil 
war. These include the possibility of actu-
al gain of an ally or base in the event that 
their side wins, the cultivation of a “proxy” 
who might serve their interests at a later 
date, the domestic or international reputa-
tion that may emerge from demonstrating 
one’s ability to influence such conflicts, or 
the desire simply to stymie the perceived 
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interests of those outside powers that sup-
port the other side. Though the number of 
such cases cannot be predicted, it is likely 
that there will be some civil wars in which 
all the combatants attract outside backing, 
and thus they can call upon a steady stream 
of financial and military assistance. Civ-
il wars that measure the power and will 
of the combatants must now measure the 
power and will of their external support-
ers. And the longer the wars go on, the 
more the citizens of the societies host-
ing the conflicts will suffer, and therefore 
the greater the number of internally dis-
placed persons and refugees. These refu-
gee populations are often seen as a securi-
ty problem, which may motivate some of 
the neighbors to advocate more intensive-
ly for a settlement, but given the complexi-
ty of negotiating such a settlement with in-
siders and outsiders simultaneously, refu-
gee-receiving countries may themselves be 
tempted to pick a side in the war.13
Finally, a changed structure of power 
should affect the nature of any achieved 
settlement, though the implications are 
a bit less clear. If one legacy of a war sup-
ported by consequential powers is that 
the combatants have become more capa-
ble than they would have otherwise, then 
settlements will require a visiting “levia-
than” to police them. In other words, to 
keep such combatants safely in their respec-
tive corners, the peace-enforcement force 
will need to be quite capable itself. Those 
outside powers who supported one side 
or the other in the civil war probably pos-
sess the best forces for such a mission, but 
by virtue of their partisanship, they would 
not be trusted. Hence the peace-enforce-
ment force may lack the capability to en-
force against plausible spoilers. On the oth-
er hand, there may be a selection effect that 
cuts the other way. Any civil war with out-
side intervention that does achieve a nego-
tiated peace will do so because the outsiders 
have agreed to it. Thus, the outsiders may 
have the greatest influence on their respec-
tive sides keeping to the peace agreement.
The Syrian Civil War, which began in 2011, 
has proven long, bloody, and immensely de-
structive. Disputes among the great powers 
stymied international preventive diploma-
cy, while direct and indirect military inter-
vention by great and middle powers in-
creased the strength of all sides, contribut-
ing to their ability and will to sustain the 
war. By 2016, there were at least four sides 
fighting within Syria, and at least five exter-
nal states or clusters of states that had in-
tervened on one or more sides.14 The war 
has many unique properties, and it would 
be wrong to attribute its terrible trajecto-
ry solely to the emergence of multipolarity. 
Resurgent Russia made it difficult to co-
ordinate international action to stabilize 
Syria. By spring 2013, Moscow had “issued 
three un Security Council vetoes, bent over 
backwards to water down the Geneva Com-
munique calling for a peaceful transition of 
authority, and fastidiously avoided joining 
the call for ‘Assad to go.’”15 Close observ-
ers suggest that Russia has many overlap-
ping interests in Syria, an important one 
of which seems to be normative. Russia 
opposes regime change, including regime 
change under the rubric of humanitarian 
intervention or r2p, partly because of the 
risk that this could ultimately legitimate an 
international effort to bring about regime 
change in Russia.16 China seems to share 
Russia’s view, and also cast a veto in the un 
Security Council in October 2011.17 Brazil, 
India, and South Africa all abstained from 
supporting the resolution because they, too, 
oppose outside intervention in internal po-
litical disputes.18 
In this arena for normative contestation, 
Russia and China have both exploited the 
legitimacy of the Security Council to sti-
fle the effort to develop a new intervention 
norm. In contrast to its role in the Balkans, 
in which the United States and its Western 
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allies bypassed the Security Council and at-
tempted to assert that the victorious Cold 
War liberal coalition could legitimate its 
own wars, the United States has seemed less 
willing to go around the Council in the Syr-
ian context. This may be because in a mul-
tipolar world, it is more important to the 
United States to protect the integrity of the 
sole institution in which great powers coop-
erate as equals; or it may be, as some have 
suggested, that Barack Obama was simply 
personally disinclined to go around the 
Council. 
From the outset, the Syrian Civil War 
saw a pattern of external intervention in 
which bids for quick victory, in many cases 
enabled by outside aid, precipitated more 
outside intervention to stalemate initially 
successful offensives. These external inter-
ventions were often motivated by outsider 
interests in regional strategic objectives.19 
Rather than producing either a victory or a 
hurting stalemate, competitive interven-
tions produced a dynamic military compe-
tition, in which the competitors could al-
ways believe that with a bit more outside 
help, they might prevail. In contrast to 
the Bosnia endgame, in which the United 
States built up the Bosniak forces and then 
orchestrated a hurting stalemate to bring 
all to the table, no diplomatically useful 
balance of military forces has yet emerged 
in Syria. In Bosnia, almost all outside inter-
veners worked in favor of the Croats or the 
Bosniaks; the Serbs could slowly be stran-
gled. This is clearly not the case in Syria.
Precipitated by political activity across 
the Middle East associated with the 
“Arab Spring,” regime opponents in Syr-
ia launched protests and demonstrations 
starting in March 2011. Regime repression 
was often violent, but the regime also at-
tempted to deal with the demonstrations 
politically, both with messaging and mod-
est reforms. By May, however, the interac-
tions between demonstrators and securi-
ty forces became increasingly violent. The 
United States and Europe imposed a range 
of economic sanctions on Syria in response 
to the regime’s behavior, but Russia and 
China vetoed the un Security Council res-
olution calling for an end to the regime’s 
crackdown. During these early months 
of the struggle, regime opponents them-
selves turned increasingly to violence. The 
history of external intervention in this pe-
riod has not been written, but by the last 
quarter of 2011, the “rebels” appeared well-
armed and well-funded.20 Observers focus 
on the rebels’ many weaknesses relative to 
the regime, which are real. But we should 
also note the rapid escalation of the fight-
ing. Once the rebels began to have success 
against the regime, the regime found sup-
port abroad from both Iran and Russia. Iran 
seems to have committed itself to the re-
gime in January of 2012.21 This precipitat-
ed still more outside assistance to the rebels, 
which prompted still more assistance to the 
regime. Theorists have observed this pat-
tern in other wars, finding that it generally 
contributes to duration and destruction.22
Finally, the complexity of the battle map, 
featuring multiple international actors, 
seems to be affecting Western notions of 
a settlement. As previously noted, the Syr-
ian Civil War consists of four major internal 
players. From a simple conflict between re-
gime and rebels, the map is now character-
ized by a multiplicity of rebel groups, many 
of which are at war with each other. The “Is-
lamic State,” in fact, formed when one reb-
el faction split from the others and aligned 
with like-minded Iraqis. Of the remaining 
rebel groups, the other offshoots of Al Qae-
da seem to be the strongest, though they do 
not control the larger coalition, which is 
loosely organized at best. The Kurds have 
emerged as a faction in their own right, 
aligning themselves with the United States 
to fight the Islamic State, but, to the extent 
possible, staying out of fights with other 
groups while they try to carve out an auton-
omous zone. Given the military power of 
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all these groups, outside interveners would 
have a difficult peacekeeping task ahead of 
them, even if those who had backed differ-
ent sides could agree on a settlement. In-
creasingly, one hears of proposals based on 
de facto partition of the country.23 In the 
early phases of the war in Bosnia, the Unit-
ed States in particular would not support 
such an outcome, though the Dayton Ac-
cords ultimately produced a nominally uni-
tary state that left the principal combatants 
in control of their own regions. Even this 
agreement required enormous policing in 
its first years. In Syria, it appears that ob-
servers now have even smaller ambitions: 
stabilizing group borders along the existing 
battle lines, with the exception of the Islam-
ic State, which insiders and outsiders seem 
to agree must be annihilated.
Recent and plausible future changes in 
the global distribution of power demand 
analysis of their potential impact. Here I 
have probed how a shift from a unipolar to 
a multipolar world might affect the problem 
of international cooperation to prevent, ter-
minate, and settle civil wars. This was main-
ly a deductive enterprise, supplemented 
with examples from two cases: the Balkan 
Wars of the early 1990s and the Syrian Civil 
War. Cases selected for their strong exem-
plary utility cannot prove an argument. The 
analysis is, however, suggestive. Preventive 
diplomacy will likely be fraught with com-
petitive behavior among the strong powers 
possessing the capacity to suppress an esca-
lating civil conflict; and this same compet-
itive behavior will likely add military and 
diplomatic resources to the competing civ-
il war factions, allowing them all to believe 
that another round of fighting and exter-
nal assistance will bring victory. Finally, the 
Darwinian process of extended warfare may 
so increase the combat power of the parties 
that any negotiated settlement will require 
very capable peace-enforcement/peace-
keeping forces to separate the combatants 
long enough for political and economic re-
construction to take hold. These problems 
will not characterize every civil war, because 
multipolarity also means that consequential 
powers are often busy with their own par-
ticular security problems. But they will be 
more prevalent than they were during the 
short lived “unipolar moment.”
If this analysis is correct, it provides a 
bit of advice for those statespersons who 
wish to take up the cause of the interna-
tional management of civil wars. Dip-
lomats may find it useful to be more cir-
cumspect in their purposes. Rather than 
assuming agreement, or the potential for 
agreement, among ideologically like-mind-
ed great powers, diplomats may need to re-
turn to a more traditional approach of find-
ing elements of agreement among powers 
who largely see themselves in a competitive 
relationship. Post–Cold War approaches to 
civil war management tended to combine 
humanitarian and ideological (usually lib-
eral) purposes. People needed help, but it 
was often believed that short-term help had 
to be combined with major political reform 
to ensure against future violence. Finding 
agreement on both sets of issues is difficult 
in any case, but will be much harder as more 
capable powers see more security interests 
at stake in these conflicts. The diplomacy of 
civil war management is no easier than any 
other kind of diplomacy, and cannot be re-
duced to a formula. But perhaps if outsiders 
reach for less, they will get more.
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